Why Email Forwarding Breaks Everything
SPF dies on the first relay. DKIM survives until a mailing list edits the message. Then DMARC turns a 40-year-old nuisance into bounced mail. A tour of email's most reliably broken feature.
Protocols, security incidents, and how the internet actually works. 147 posts.
SPF dies on the first relay. DKIM survives until a mailing list edits the message. Then DMARC turns a 40-year-old nuisance into bounced mail. A tour of email's most reliably broken feature.
You set a TTL of 300 expecting changes in five minutes. Then traffic keeps hitting the old IP for an hour. TTL is not a schedule — it's a hint passed down a chain of caches that each reserve the right to ignore you.
A valid DKIM signature does not mean DMARC passes. The signature proves a domain signed the mail — alignment decides whether that domain is allowed to speak for your From address.
In 2017 a researcher registered a domain that displayed as apple.com in three major browsers, served over valid HTTPS. Every character was Cyrillic. The reason it's hard to fix is older and stranger than the bug itself.
Any one of ~150 certificate authorities can mint a valid cert for your domain. Your security is the weakest of all of them. Here's why it mostly works anyway.
QUIC is reliable, ordered, congestion-controlled, and encrypted — everything UDP refuses to be. So why build it on UDP? Because UDP was the only new-protocol-shaped hole left in the internet's plumbing.
Everyone says there are 13 DNS root servers. There are about 2,000. The number 13 is frozen into the internet because of a packet-size limit nobody worries about anymore — and the way that contradiction got resolved is one of the better infrastructure hacks ever shipped.
DNS runs the busiest request-response system on the internet on top of a transport that doesn't promise your packet will arrive. That wasn't a shortcut. It was the right call — until the answers got too big.
You can type any browser you like into your User-Agent string. It's the one field nobody trusts — because everything underneath it, the TLS handshake and the HTTP/2 settings, was written by your libraries, not by you.
CDN consolidation means a single outage takes down thousands of sites. We traded distributed resilience for centralized convenience.
DoH wraps DNS queries in HTTPS. Same questions, same answers, different transport. The technical change is simple. The political implications are enormous.
CDN cache poisoning tricks a CDN into caching a malicious response and serving it to all subsequent visitors. One weird request, a lot of collateral.