Why Email Forwarding Breaks Everything
SPF dies on the first relay. DKIM survives until a mailing list edits the message. Then DMARC turns a 40-year-old nuisance into bounced mail. A tour of email's most reliably broken feature.
Protocols, security incidents, and how the internet actually works. 147 posts.
SPF dies on the first relay. DKIM survives until a mailing list edits the message. Then DMARC turns a 40-year-old nuisance into bounced mail. A tour of email's most reliably broken feature.
A valid DKIM signature does not mean DMARC passes. The signature proves a domain signed the mail — alignment decides whether that domain is allowed to speak for your From address.
More than half of the domains that 'have' DMARC don't enforce it — usually they sit at p=none, which means monitor but don't enforce. It's a smoke detector without a siren.
SPF, DKIM, DMARC, MTA-STS, BIMI — five standards, twenty years, and nobody can hand you a clean count of the domains that have all five. Every partial measurement points the same way.
RFC 7208 limits SPF to 10 DNS lookups. Exceed it and your email authentication silently breaks. The limit made sense in 2006. It doesn't anymore.
2FA stops credential stuffing. It barely slows down the real-time phishing proxies that are actually stealing sessions in 2026.
SPF, DKIM, DMARC, BIMI, MTA-STS — email keeps stacking protocols on a 40-year-old system instead of replacing it. Here's why.